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Intramilitary Tort Immunity: A
Comparison of the United States
and Great Britain
By JENNIFER BECKETr*
Member of the Class of 1991
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States and Great Britain both adhere to the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, under which the state can be sued only when it con-
sents to the suit.' This doctrine developed in Great Britain from the
medieval belief that the king could do no wrong, and has been followed
in the United States since the formation of the Union.2
In 1946 and 1947, respectively, the United States and Great Britain
passed tort claims acts, both of which partially waived the national gov-
ernment's sovereign immunity by allowing individuals to sue the govern-
ment in tort.
3
Great Britain's tort claims act, the Crown Proceedings Act of 1947,
(the 1947 Act) contained a military exception.4 That exception, embod-
ied in section 10 of the 1947 Act, prohibited military personnel from
suing the Crown or fellow servicemembers for torts committed while on
* B.A., Barnard College, 1983; M.A., N.Y.U., 1986. The author dedicates this Note to
William J. and Florence Beckett.
1. Mahoney, Suing the State: A Comparison of Remedies Provided for Individual Rights
Violations in Great Britain and the United States, 56 UMKC L Rsv. 435, 461 (1988); Note,
United States v. Johnson: The Supreme Court Extends the Feres Doctrine Bar to FFCA Recov-
ery Against Non-Military Tortfeasors, 22 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 199, 199 (1988) [hereinafter
Note, Supreme Court Extends the Feres Doctrine Bar]; Note, Intramilitary Tort Immunity, A
Constitutional Justification, 15 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 623, 625 (1988) [hereinafter Note, In-
tramilitary Tort Immunity].
2. Note, Supreme Court Extends the Feres Doctrine, supra note 1, at 199 n.1 (1988); 1 L.
JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CI.AIMS § 51 (1989). See also Comment, The Feres Doc-
trine: Should It Continue to Bar FTCA Actions by Servicemen Who Are Injured While Involved
in Activities Incident to Their Service?, 49 J. AIR L. & CoM. 177, 180-82 (1983) (discussing the
development of sovereign immunity in the United States).
3. Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, ch. 44 [hereinafter Crown Proceedings
Act] Federal Tort Claims Act. Pub. L. No. 79-601. §§ 401-424, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) [hereinafter FTCA]
4. Crown Proceedings Act, supra note 3, § 10.
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duty or on Crown land.' The U.S. tort claims act, the Federal Tort
Claims Act (the FTCA), contains no military exception.6 The Supreme
Court created such an exception when it decided Feres v. United States in
1950.7 This exception, which has come to be known as the "Feres doc-
trine," bars military personnel from suing under the FTCA "where the
injuries arise out of or are [sustained] in the course of activity incident to
service."'
Recently, Great Britain enacted the Crown Proceedings (Armed
Forces) Act of 1987 (the 1987 Act), which repealed section 10 of the
1947 Act.9 Now, except in time of war, imminent national danger, or
great emergency, military personnel may sue the Crown under the same
circumstances as civilians. 10 The United States, on the other hand, con-
tinues to deny its military personnel the right to sue the government
under the FTCA.11
In this Note, I will examine the policies underlying the Feres doc-
trine. I will then discuss the passage of section 10 of the 1947 Act and
the reasons for its repeal. I will examine the equities of intramilitary tort
immunity, and discuss legislative efforts to narrow the Feres doctrine. I
will conclude with a discussion of the advisability of abrogating the Feres
doctrine in light of the British experience.
II. INTRAMILITARY TORT IMMUNITY IN THE
UNITED STATES
A. The Development of the Feres Doctrine12
Congress defines the terms and conditions for bringing suit against
5. Id.
6. FTCA, supra note 3.
7. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
8. Id. at 146.
9. Crown Proceedings (Armed Forces) Act, 1987, ch. 25, § 1.
10. Id
11. See Note, Supreme Court Extends the Fetes Doctrine Bar, supra note 1, at 200.01.
12. For an overview of the development of the Feres doctrine, see, e.g., Note, United
States v. Stanley: Has the Feres Doctrine Become a Grant of Absolute Immunity?, 23 N.W
ENG. L. REv. 767, 768-89 (1988-89) [hereinafter Note, Absolute .mmunity]; Note, The Fetes
Doctrine: Should It Bar Claims by Military Personnel Against Civilian Federal Employees?, 15
N. Ky. L. REv. 559, 562-76 (1988) [hereinafter Note, The Fetes Doctrine]; Note, Forgotten
Rights of Military Personnel: An End to Congressional Acquiescence?, 6 LAw & INEQUALITY
153, 156-69 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Forgotten Rights of Military Personnel]; Note, United
States v. Johnson: Feres Doctrine Gets New Life and Continues to Grow, 38 AM. U.L, REv.
185, 185-216 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Fetes Doctrine Gets New Life]; Note, United States v.
Johnson: Expansion of the Fetes Doctrine to Include Servicemembers' FTCA Suits Against
Civilian Government Employees, 42 VAND. L. REv. 233, 237-47 (1989) [hereinafter Note,
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the United States. 3 Until 1946, when Congress passed the FTCA, one
could bring a tort action against the United States government only
through a private bill.14 In passing the FTCA, Congress waived federal
governmental immunity in tort actions arising out of the acts or omis-
sions of federal employees acting within the scope of their employment.15
The scope of the government's liability is limited to situations in which a
private person would be liable under the law of the jurisdiction in which
the claim arose. 6
The FTCA contains a number of exceptions. For example, it ex-
cludes claims arising out of the combatant activities of the armed forces
during time of war, and suits arising in foreign countries.'7 However, no
provision of the FTCA prevents military personnel from suing the gov-
ernment for injury or death arising out of noncombatant activities.'
The first case in which the Supreme Court applied the FTCA to
military personnel was Brooks v. United States. 9 Brooks arose from the
injury of one off-duty serviceman and the death of another serviceman in
an off-base collision with an army vehicle.2" In reaching its decision that
the claims were cognizable under the FTCA, the Court first referred to
the language of the FTCA.21 The Court noted that in providing jurisdic-
tion to the district courts, Congress did not exclude claims brought under
the FTCA by servicemen. 2 Rather, it provided for jurisdiction over
"any claim founded on negligence brought against the United States."'
Next, the Court suggested that in drafting the FTCA, Congress did not
simply overlook the military.24 The Court reasoned that the FTCA's
combatant activities and foreign country exceptions clearly demonstrated
Expansion of the Feres Doctrine]; Note, Intramilitary Tort Immunity, supra note 1, at 625-30
(1988).
13. The Feres Doctrine and Military Medical Malpractice: Hearing on & 489 and H.
3174 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1986) [hereinafter Malpractice] (statement of Robert L.
Wilimore, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Dep't of Justice).
14. 1 L. JAYSON, supra note 2, § 65.02 (1989). A private bill is a method of obtaining
relief from Congress through private legislation. I. § 52.
15. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2679 (West 1965 & Supp. 1989).
16. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b) (West 1976).
17. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680G), (k) (West 1965).
18. See FTCA, supra note 3.
19. 337 U.S. 49 (1949). For discussion of Brooks, see Note, Feres Doctrine Gets New Life,
supra note 12, at 197-98; Note, Expansion of the Feres Doctrine, supra note 12, at 237-38.
20. Brooks, 337 U.S. at 50.
21. Id at 51.
22. Id
23. Id (emphasis in original).
24. Id
1990]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
that Congress had servicemembers in mind when framing the Act.2" The
Court further noted that although sixteen of the eighteen tort claims bills
introduced in Congress between 1925 and 1935 contained military excep-
tions, the final version contained no such exception.26 This indicated to
the Court that the FTCA drafters consciously chose not to create a mili-
tary exception to the FTCA.27 The availability of other statutory disabil-
ity benefits to servicemembers did not preclude suit for damages under
the FTCA. The Court suggested that FTCA awards could be reduced by
other compensation received by the servicemembers. 8
The Supreme Court's decision in Brooks did not address whether the
FTCA would apply to military personnel injured incident to service.
The Court explicitly stated that its decision applied only to non-service-
related injuries.29 The application of the FTCA to injuries that are inci-
dent to service would be a "wholly different case" for the Court to
decide.3"
That case came before the Court a year later in Feres v. United
States.31 The Supreme Court decided Feres with two companion cases:
Jefferson v. United States and United States v. Griggs,32 Each case arose
out of the injury or death of an active duty serviceman caused by the
alleged negligence of members of the armed forces.33
In Feres, a serviceman died in a barracks fire.34 His survivors al-
leged negligence on the part of the United States Army in quartering him
in barracks known to be unsafe due to a defective heating plant, and in
failing to maintain an adequate fire watch.35 Jefferson and Griggs both
arose from alleged military medical malpractice.36 Jefferson claimed
that an army surgeon had negligently left a towel thirty inches long by
eighteen inches wide in his abdomen. 37 Griggs' executrix alleged that
Griggs died because of negligent treatment by army surgeons.38
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id at 51-52.
28. Id. at 53.
29. Id. at 52.
30. Id
31. For discussion of the Feres decision, see Note, Feres Doctrine Gets New Life, supra
note 12, at 198-204; Note, Expansion of the Feres Doctrine, supr7 note 12, at 239-44.
32. Feres, 340 U.S. at 135.
33. Id. at 138.







In attempting to apply the FTCA to these cases, the Court in Feres
found no clear guidance in the language of the FTCA.39 It initially rear-
ticulated a number of the textual and historical arguments for allowing
recovery, as set forth in Brooks, but ultimately held that the provisions of
the FTCA did not encompass the claims before it.'
The Court in Feres gave three reasons for its ruling. First, the Court
interpreted section 2674 of the FTCA. Under that section "[tjhe United
States shall be liable.., in the same manner and to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances."4  The Court maintained
that since there was no private circumstance analogous to the relation-
ship between servicemembers and superiors, and since there had never
been an American law that allowed recovery for one servicemember's
negligent or wrongful acts toward another, there could be no cause of
action under the FTCA.42
Second, the Court discussed section 1346 of the FTCA, which re-
quires that the substantive laws of the state in which the act or omission
occurred govern actions arising under the FTCA.43 The Court held that
the "distinctively federal" character of the relationship between the gov-
ernment and members of the armed forces should not be governed by the
laws of the several states." In addition, the Court reasoned that a mem-
ber of the armed forces should not involuntarily be subjected to the laws
of the state in which he happened to be stationed.45
The third reason the Court gave for its decision was the availability
of statutory disability and death benefits for servicemembers.4 s The
39. Id at 138.
40. Id at 146.
41. Id at 141 (quoting 28 U.S.C.A. § 2674 (West 1965 & Supp. 1989)).
42. Id at 141-42.
43. Id at 142.
44. Id at 143. The author interprets the Supreme Court's statements concerning its re-
luctance to apply divergent state laws to the military, and the distinctively federal character of
the military as comprising one rationale underlying the Feres decision. At least one other
commentator believes that these constitute two separate rationales. See Note, Feres Doctrine
Gets New Life, supra note 12, at 201-02.
45. Feres, 340 U.S. at 142-43.
46. Id at 144 (citing 48 Stat. 8 (1933) (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 701 (1946)); 48
Stat. 11 (1933) (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 718 (1946)); 55 Stat. 608 (1941) (codified as
amended at 38 U.S.C. § 725 (1946)); 57 Stat. 558 (1943) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 731 (1946));
62 Stat. 1219, 1220 (1948) (codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 740, 741 (Supp. 11 1950)). Many of these
statutes have been superseded. In a recent hearing, Brent 0. Hatch described the current
statutory compensation benefits available to servicemembers:
First, members of the uniformed services serving on active duty receive free medical
care when injured or ill. See, eg., 10 U.S.C. §§ 3721, 6201, and 8721. They also
receive unlimited sick leave with full pay and allowances until well or released from
active duty. Survivors of service members are entitled to death gratuity benefits
1990]
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Court maintained that if Congress had intended to allow servicemembers
to recover damages under the FTCA, then it would have made provi-
sions within the Act to take these benefits into account.47 The Court
further reasoned that the statutory compensation schemes were in some
ways superior to the remedies available through an FTCA action.48 For
example, the statutory compensation systems did not require ser-
vicemembers to litigate the issue of liability.49 Further, the amount re-
coverable under these compensation schemes compared favorably to
awards under state workers' compensation statutes.50
In the years following Feres, the Supreme Court undermined the
three rationales supporting the decision while maintaining the doctrine
itself. The Supreme Court undermined all three Feres rationales in
United States v. Brown.5 The Court in Brown upheld a veteran's award
of damages for negligence in the treatment of his injured knee in a Veter-
ans Administration (VA) hospital.52 The injury occurred while the plain-
tiff was on active duty in the armed services, but the operation took place
after his discharge. 3 Although Brown had been treated in a VA hospital,
the Court held that Feres did not apply because medical care in a VA
hospital was analogous to treatment in a civilian hospital.54 Interest-
which include six months of base pay (10 U.S.C. §§ 1475-1.182), as well as unique,
subsidized insurance or insurance-type plans. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1447, et seq.; 38 U.S.C.
§§ 765, et seq.
Second, Congress has established a comprehensive disability retirement system
for service members permanently injured in the line of duty. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1201,
1401. Moreover, should a service member leave the service without seeking disability
retirement, he may later request it ....
Third, the Veterans Benefits Act provides yet another aystem of medical care,
disability and death benefits for the service-disabled veteran and his family. [Citing:
38 U.S.C. §§ 301-361: Compensation for Service-Connected Disability or Death; 38
U.S.C. §§ 501-562: Pension for Non-Service Connected Disability for Death or for
Service; 38 U.S.C. §§ 401-423: Dependency and Indemnity Compensation for Ser-
vice-Connected Deaths; 38 U.S.C. §§ 601-654: Hospital, Nursing Home, or Domi-
ciliary Care and Medical Treatment; 38 U.S.C. §§ 701-788: National Service Life
Insurance].
Medical Malpractice Suits for Armed Services Personnel: Hearing on S. 2490 and H.R. 1054
Before the Senate Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Practice of the Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 71-72, 72 n.1 (1988) [hereinafter Medical Malpractice] (statement of
Brent 0. Hatch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Dep't of Justice).
47. Feres, 340 U.S. at 144.
48. Id. at 145.
49. Id
50. Id
51. 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
52. Id at 110.
53. Id. at 110-11.
54. Id at 110-13.
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ingly, the Supreme Court did not employ the private sector analogy de-
veloped in the Feres trio of cases, despite the fact that two of the three
arose out of medical malpractice claims."5 The Court in Brown also un-
dermined the Feres alternative compensation scheme rationale by ruling
that Brown could recover under the FTCA even though he was entitled
to VA benefits. The Court reasoned that Congress could have made the
compensation system an exclusive remedy, but chose not to provide for
such exclusivity.5 6 However, the Court had argued in Feres that because
there were alternative compensation schemes, the cases could not be
brought under the FTCA.57 Thus, the Court in Brown explicitly under-
mined twb of the rationales for Feres: the lack of private analogy to mili-
tary operations and the availability of alternative compensation schemes
to servicemembers.58 Further, the Court implicitly frustrated the state
law rationale: Brown's case would be tried under the applicable state
law.
5 9
Nonmilitary cases in which the Supreme Court undermined the
Feres rationales include Indian Towing Co. v. United States,6° in which
the Court allowed recovery against the Coast Guard for negligently oper-
ating a lighthouse, even though the operation of lighthouses is a
"uniquely governmental function[ ]5,;61 and United States v. Muniz,62 in
which the Court ruled that a federal prisoner could sue under the FTCA
for negligent acts by prison officials, even though statutory compensation
was available to him.63
With the erosion of the original principles behind Feres, the main
rationale for a military exception to the FTCA ultimately became the
fear of a breakdown in military discipline if courts allowed military per-
sonnel to sue for injuries sustained incident to service. The Court in
Feres mentioned this concern only in passing.64 However, in the Brown
decision, the Supreme Court elevated the need to maintain military disci-
pline to a major underpinning of the military exception to the FrCA.65
The Court reasoned that it had allowed recovery in Brooks because the
55. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
56. Brown, 348 U.S. at 113.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 46-50.
58. IdL
59. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45; see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b) (West 1976).
60. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
61. IaM at 64.
62. 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
63. Id at 160.
64. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 143-44 (1950).
65. United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954).
1990]
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plaintiff was injured while not on active duty or subject to military disci-
pline.66 Therefore, it should permit recovery in Brown on the same
grounds.67 The Court in Brown maintained that in Feres it was the "pe-
culiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, [and] the
effects of the maintenance of... [FTCA] suits on discipline" that led the
Court in Feres to exclude the claims before it.6 ]Brown's suit, however,
did not implicate military discipline.69
In recent decisions, the Supreme Court has relied on the military
discipline argument to expand the Feres doctrine.70 In Stencel Aero En-
gineering Corp. v. United States,7' the Court held that the Feres doctrine
prevented a third party indemnity suit against the United States. Stencel
arose from the infliction of permanent injuries to a serviceman when the
ejection system of his fighter aircraft malfunctioned.72 The United States
had given Stencel the specifications for the system and supplied certain
components used in the manufacture of the aircraft.73 The serviceman
sued the United States and Stencel, alleging that the emergency ejection
system had malfunctioned as a result of the individual and joint negli-
gence of the defendants.74 Stencel cross-claimed against the United
States for indemnity, claiming that any malfunction in the ejection sys-
tem was due to faulty specifications, requirements, and components pro-
vided by the United States.75 In addition, Stencel claimed that since the
system had been in the exclusive custody and control of the United States
since the time of its manufacture, Stencel's negligence was passive, while
the negligence of the United States was active. 76 Therefore, Stencel






70. Note, Feres Doctrine Gets New Life, supra note 12, at 206-10.
71. 431 U.S. 666 (1977). For discussion of Stencel, see Whalen, Feres and Stencel Revls-
ited: Liability of the United States for Contribution and Indemnity in Cases Involving Service-
men, 18 FORUM 107 (1982-83). Whalen believed that "the exclusivity of the military
compensation system [would] be the ultimate rationale for the Feres doctrine." Id. at 112.
Subsequent cases have proved otherwise, and the most important rationale for Feres is the
military discipline rationale. See supra text accompanying notes 64-67; see also infra text ac-
companying notes 83-98, 107-108, 116.
72. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 667.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 668.
75. Id
76. Id
77. d at 668.
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The Supreme Court rejected Stencel's arguments and applied the
Feres doctrine to bar Stencel's indemnity action against the United
States. 78 The Court first held that the relationship between the Govern-
ment and its suppliers was as federal in character as the relationship be-
tween the Government and its soldiers.79 Second, even though statutory
compensation was not available to Stencel, the existence of such compen-
sation influenced its decision. 0 The Court contended that these schemes
served a dual purpose: to provide a remedy to servicemembers and to
limit the liability of the United States for service-related injuries."1 To
allow recovery by Stencel would thus frustrate the purposes of the com-
pensation schemes.82
Most important, the Court held that although Stencel's indemnifica-
tion action was not being brought by a member of the military, the effect
upon military discipline would be as great as if a servicemember had
brought suit.83 The Court noted its distaste for civilian courts "second-
guessing military orders" and for members of the armed forces testifying
about each other's decisions and actions. 4
The Court again used the military discipline rationale to expand the
Feres doctrine in United States v. Shearer."S In Shearer, the Court disal-
lowed recovery even though the victim of the military's alleged negli-
gence was off-base and off-duty at the time the incident occurred. 6
Army Private Vernon Shearer was kidnapped and murdered by another
serviceman. 7 His estate alleged that the Army, knowing that the at-
tacker was dangerous, "negligently and carelessly failed to exert a rea-
sonably sufficient control over" him, and "failed to warn other persons
that he was at large."8 8
The Court disallowed the claim because it believed that the claim
went "directly to the 'management' of the military," and called into
question "basic choices about the discipline, supervision, and control of a
78. Id. at 667-74.
79. Id at 672.





85. 473 U.S. 52 (1985).
86. Id at 53, 59.
87. Id at 53.
88. Id at 54. First, the Supreme Court noted that the claim was barred under the assault
and battery exception to the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), since, although the claim was for
negligence, the incident arose out of an act of assault and battery. Id
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serviceman."'8 9 This result was surprising since tlhe Court in Brooks al-
lowed recovery by servicemembers who were off-base and off-duty.9"
The Court ruled that it was irrelevant that the serviceman was off-base
and off-duty when the attack occurred because the claim would require a
civilian court to "second-guess military decisions," thus "impair[ing] es-
sential military discipline."9"
The Court further expanded the Feres doctrine in United States v.
Johnson92 to bar an FTCA action by a servicemember against civilian
employees of the federal government. Lieutenant Commander Horton
Winfield Johnson, a United States Coast Guard helicopter pilot, died in a
crash after requesting radar assistance from the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA), a civilian organization. 93 His widow sued the gov-
ernment under the FTCA, alleging that the FAA flight controllers
negligently caused her husband's death.94 Because the widow's suit arose
from injuries sustained during a Coast Guard rescue mission, the Court
found that it potentially would implicate military discipline, and, there-
fore, fell "within the heart of the Feres doctrine." 9-; In denying relief, the
Court reasoned that military discipline was involved even though the al-
leged tortfeasors were civilians: "[A] suit based upon service-related ac-
tivity necessarily implicates the military judgments and decisions that are
inextricably intertwined with the conduct of the military mission."9 6 The
Court argued that "military discipline involves not only obedience to or-
ders, but more generally duty and loyalty to one's service and to one's
89. Id. at 58.
90. See supra text accompanying note 20. One can distinguish Shearer from Brooks be-
cause in Shearer, the army's negligence in allowing Shearer's killer to remain in the military
was at issue, whereas in Brooks, the liability of the individual negligent servicemembers was In
question.
91. Shearer, 473 U.S. at 57.
92. 481 U.S. 681 (1987). For criticism of Johnson, see Note, Expansion of the Fcrcs Doc-
trine, supra note 12, at 260 (arguing that the Supreme Court "created the (Feres] doctrine and
then manipulated it to the point that it virtually can be molded to fit any result that the Court
desires."); Note, The Feres Doctrine, supra note 12, at 579 (arguing that the Court relied
wrongly on the military discipline rationale to decide this case, b-.cause this rationale is based
on "'the peculiar and special relationships [sic] of the soldier to his superiors,' and this rela-
tionship is not implicated when the suit is against civilian federal employees") (footnote omit-
ted); Note, Feres Doctrine Gets New Life, supra note 12, at 216-223 (arguing that the suit filed
on Johnson's behalf did not affect military discipline or decisions); Note, Supreme Court Ex-
tends the Feres Doctrine Bar, supra note 1 (criticizing the extension of the Feres doctrine in
Johnson to bar recovery under the FTCA when military personnel are injured by civilian gov-
ernment employees).
93. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 682.
94. Id. at 682-83.
95. Id. at 691-92.
96. Id. at 690-91.
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country." 97 Even if a suit is not brought against the military itself, it
"could undermine the commitment essential to effective service and thus
have the potential to disrupt military discipline in the broadest sense of
the word."9'
In Chappell v. Wallace,99 the Court extended the Feres doctrine be-
yond the FTCA context to disallow Bivens claims"° against superior of-
ficers.Y° 1 The plaintiff servicemen in Chappell, five enlisted Navy men,
alleged that "because of their minority race, petitioners [their superior
officers] failed to assign them desirable duties, threatened them, gave
them low performance evaluations, and imposed penalties of unusual se-
verity."'" 2 The servicemen claimed that the officers deprived them of
their constitutional right not to be discriminated against because of race
or color,'03 and alleged that the officers violated 42 U.S.C. section 1985
by conspiring to deprive them of their constitutional rights."° Although
constitutional violations are not actionable under the FTCA, the Court
applied the Feres doctrine to preclude the suit. 05
The Court in Chappell reasoned that Congress had enacted statutes
regulating military life and had established a comprehensive internal mil-
itary system of justice by taking into account the special patterns that
define the military structure."°6 In addition, the Court stressed the need
for discipline within the armed services, stating that "no military organi-
zation can function without strict discipline and regulation that would be
unacceptable in a civilian setting."10 7 The Court reasoned that because
of the "special relationships that define military life," and the intrusion
on that relationship that a civilian trial would create, the military should
handle the servicemens' alleged violations of constitutional rights.'
08
The Court also relied on Feres in United States v. Stanley to prohibit
97. I at 691.
98. Id
99. 462 U.S. 296 (1983). For further discussion of Chappell see Note, Intramilitary Tort
Immunity, supra note 12, at 631-33.
100. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971), the Supreme Court allowed a claim for a violation of constitutional rights against the
offending officials even in the absence of a statute authorizing such relief. Such claims are now
known as "Bivens claims." United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 669 (1987).
101. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 296.
102. Id at 297.
103. Id
104. Id
105. Id at 299-305.
106. Id at 302.
107. Id at 300.
108. Id at 305.
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a Bivens claim against federal officers and the University of Maryland for
alleged secret administration of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) to a
serviceman." ° In 1958, James B. Stanley, a master sergeant in the army,
had volunteered to participate in a scientific study conducted at the
Army's Chemical Warfare Laboratories at the Aberdeen Proving
Grounds in Maryland.110 As part of the study, he was secretly adminis-
tered LSD pursuant to an Army plan to study the effects of the drug on
human subjects. " Stanley suffered from hallucinations and violent out-
bursts as a result of ingesting the LSD, but did not learn that he had been
administered the hallucinogen until 1975 when he received a letter from
the Army "soliciting his cooperation in a study of the long-term effects of
LSD on 'volunteers who participated' in the 1958 tests." '112
In reaching its decision, the Court in Stanley first maintained that
the activity giving rise to the suit was "incident to service," even though
civilians conducted the tests, thus bringing the case within the Feres doc-
trine. 13 Then, despite a vigorous dissenting opinion by Justice Brennan
that the defendants violated the Nuremburg principles with regard to
human experimentation by administering LSD to servicemembers with-
out their consent, 1 4 the majority barred the suit. 15 The Court in Stan-
ley argued that if a civilian court were to decide Stanley's case, it would
intrude on military affairs and call into question the chain of military
command and military discipline.
1 16
These decisions demonstrate that the Supreme Court has steadfastly
adhered to the Feres doctrine and has expanded it into areas outside of
the FTCA, principally by relying on the military discipline argument de-
veloped in Brown. The Court in Feres acted in the absence of clear con-
109. 483 U.S. 669 (1987). See Note, Absolute Immunity, supra note 12, at 808-14 (criticiz-
ing the Stanley opinion on the grounds that (1) military discipline would not have been Im.
paired had a civil suit been allowed, and (2) the "'incident to service' . . . test does not
differentiate between a multitude of intramilitary decisions ... [since] (a]dministrative deci-
sions of military and civilian officials to experiment on unwitting soldiers with nuclear radia-
tion, mustard gas and mind altering drugs are given, but do not dserve, the same protection")
(footnotes omitted).
110. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 671.
111. Id
112. Id at 671-72.
113. Id at 680.
114. Id at 686-708 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For discussion of the dissents in Stanley, see
Note, They Fight To Protect Our Rights; Shouldn't We Do the Same for Them? Intramilitary
Immunity in Light of United States v. Stanley, 38 DE PAUL L. RInv. 127, 148-50 (1989) [here-
inafter Note, They Fight to Protect Our Rights].
115. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 680-81.
116. Id. at 681.
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gressional guidance for deciding military claims under the FTCA.117
Since the Feres decision, Congress has failed to give the Supreme Court
such guidance. Except in the area of medical malpractice, where there
have been efforts to eliminate the doctrine," 8 there has been no recent
opposition in Congress.
M. INTRAMLITARY TORT IMMUNITY
IN GREAT BRITAIN
A. Section 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act of 1947
The Crown Proceedings Act of 1947 (the 1947 Act) waived sover-
eign immunity and exposed the British Crown "to all those liabilities in
tort to which, if it were a private person... it would be subject."119
Section 10 of the 1947 Act, however, explicitly barred military personnel
from bringing suit against the Crown for personal injury or death where
the injured servicemember was entitled to receive a military pension or
compensation for the injury.12 0 This exception applied to ser-
vicemembers who were on duty or on any Crown premises used by the
armed forces when their injuries occurred.121
Three principles underlay Great Britain's military exclusion. First,
as was true in the United States when the Supreme Court decided Feres,
alternative compensation schemes were available to British military per-
sonnel and many members of Parliament believed they were comparable
if not superior to those awarded by civilian courts."n Great Britain's
Attorney General, Sir Hartley Shawcross, assumed that in most cases
pensions would "be as valuable to the soldier.., as any lump sum for
damages which he might recover."" While in the service, British ser-
vicemembers received free medical treatment. 24 When servicemembers
became disabled and left the service, or if they died, they or their depen-
117. See supra text accompanying note 39.
118. See infra text accompanying notes 209-14.
119. Crown Proceedings Act, supra note 3, § 2. For a description of the procedures for
suing the Crown in tort prior to the Crown Proceedings Act, see 146 PARt. DEB., H.L. (5th
ser.) 61-65 (1947).
120. Crown Proceedings Act, supra note 3, § 10.
121. 439 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1682-84 (1947); Dickinson, Service Personnel and the
Crown Proceedings Act, 135 NEw L.L 1025 (1985).
122. 439 PARL. DEn., H.C., supra note 121, at 1683. See also Boyd, The Crown Proceed-
ings (Armed Forces) Act 1987, 1989 PUB. L. 237, 241-45 (arguing that war pensions compare
favorably with industrial disablement benefits).
123. 439 PARL. DEB., H.C., supra note 121, at 2634.
124. Id at 1683.
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dents were entitled to pension rights.125 Since only servicemembers enti-
tled to military pensions would be excluded from suing under the
proposed Act,1 26 no one would be left uncompensated for service-related
injuries.
127
The second principle that Parliament relied on for the exclusion was
also given in the Feres decision: the lack of an analogy between the mili-
tary and a private citizen.1 28 Shawcross argued that since in military
matters "the functions of the Crown... involve duties and responsibili-
ties which no subject is required to undertake," the distinctions between
the Crown and civilians had to be taken into account in framing any tort
claims act.129 Shawcross further argued that it would be "impossible to
apply the ordinary law of tort" to military training exercises held under
battle conditions, 3 ' since these conditions were "highly dangerous and,
if done by private citizens, would.., be extremely blameworthy."'1
3 1
The third principle behind the exclusion was similar to another
Feres rationale: a fear of a dangerous effect that allowing members of the
armed forces to sue under a tort claims act would have on military disci-
pline.132 Section 10 supporters believed that military personnel should
not be threatened with liability for mistakes made in the line of duty that
result in the injury or death of other soldiers.
1 33
Despite these principles supporting a military exclusion to the 1947
Act, not every Member of Parliament favored section 10.134 Parliamen-
tary debates surrounding the proposed 1947 Act reflect dissatisfaction
with a military exclusion on the part of many Members of Parliament.
Mr. M. Turner-Samuels, Member of Parliament from Gloucester, be-
lieved that a military exclusion would result in inequality for ser-
vicemembers as compared to civilians,' 35 since "whatever an officer may
do, whatever the degree of his negligence may be and however unfortu-
nate an injury results to the soldier or Serviceman," that servicemember
would have no claim.' 36 Mr. C.H. Gage of Belfast, South, argued that
intramilitary tort immunity was justified only in training situations pecu-
125. Id
126. Id. at 2633-34.
127. See id. at 2634.
128. Id at 1679.
129. Id
130. Id. at 1682.
131. Id. at 1681.
132. Id at 1682.
133. Id
134. See id at 1690.




liar to the military.1 37 Where injuries arose from non-training situations,
conditions were much the same as in civilian life, Gage argued, and thus,
there would be no reason to prevent Parliament from extending the
rights of a tort claims act to servicemembers.
138
Critics of section 10 also noted that, although the purported purpose
of the proposed act was to enhance individual rights, 139 section 10 would
not only exclude servicemembers from the benefits of the act, it would
actually deprive them of a right that they had prior to its passage. 1"
British servicemembers traditionally could sue other individual ser-
vicemembers in tort.14 A military exception would rescind this right.14
Parliament may not have passed the Crown Proceedings Bill, how-
ever, had it not contained the military exception. 143 The armed services
strongly opposed allowing servicemembers to enjoy the provisions of a
tort claims act.'" Viscount Jowitt, the Lord Chancellor at the time that
Parliament considered the 1947 Act, declared that he had been "com-
pelled by the Service Departments" to insert section 10.145 Later, he re-
marked that he was forced either to include the exception or withdraw
the entire bill."4 Ultimately, Parliament passed the bill containing the
exception.
B. The Repeal of Section 10147
In the early 1980s British organizations of veterans and their fami-
lies and survivors began to advocate the repeal of section 10.148 These
organizations included the Section Ten Abolition Group (STAG),149 the
British Nuclear Test Veterans Association, 150 and the British Atomic
Veterans Association. 5' In 1983 an interdepartmental group of officials
from the Ministry of Defence and other concerned Government depart-
137. Id at 1714.
138. See id.
139. 1 CURRENT LAW CONSOLIMATION § 7640 (J. Burke & C. Walsh eds. 1952).
140. See 439 PAR.L. DEB., I-.C., supra note 121, at 1722-23.
141. Id. at 1723.
142. Id
143. Dickinson, supra note 121, at 1025.
144. Id.
145. Id at 1025 (quoting 439 PAR.. DEB., H.C, supra note 121, at 1741 (1947)).
146. 110 PARt. DEB., H.C., (6th ser.) 580 (1987) (quoting 146 PARL. DEB., Mr-, supra
note 119, at 382.)
147. For other commentary on the repeal of section 10, see Dickinson, An Injustice Finally
Remedied?, 137 NEw LJ. 435 (1987); Boyd, supra note 122.
148. See 110 PARi. DEB., H.C., supra note 146, at 568, 591-92.
149. 94 PARt. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 849 (1986).
150. 107 PARL. DEB., I-.C. (6th ser.) 143 (1986).
151. 110 PARL.. DEB., H.C., supra note 146, at 576.
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ments was established to review the operation and effects of section 10.152
The Right Honorable Jack Ashley of Stoke-on-Trent was the main
force in Parliament behind the repeal. 153 Ashley argued that section 10
resulted in the "deprivation of basic human rights," robbing ser-
vicemembers of a privilege granted to civilians under the Crown Proceed-
ings Act.154  Ashley further argued that the armed services would
exercise greater care in training servicemembers if Parliament repealed
section 10, since the courts would hold the services, more accountable for
the actions of their officers and soldiers. 155 In addition, Ashley argued
that the pensions given to military personnel were inadequate and that
Parliament should allow servicemembers to recover awards of the size
given in civil suits.156
Early in the repeal debates, the Right Honorable John Stanley, the
Minister of State for Defence, raised a number of objections to the repeal
of section 10, each of which Ashley countered. Stanley argued that a
repeal would endanger military discipline. 57 Ashley summarily replied
that military "discipline is irrelevant to legal redress." '58 The Minister
argued that allowing servicemembers' claims would create anomalies,
since those injured in wartime would not be able to recover, whereas
those injured in other situations would be entitled to recovery."3 9 Ashley
countered that the "basic anomaly is that comparable public servants,
such as policemen and firemen, can sue for negligence [even though] they
receive the same ... pension as soldiers, sailors and airmen." 160 Stanley
argued that attempting to define the dividing line between military action
and other activities would create uncertainty as to which activities would
be subject to suit.161 Ashley replied that any servicemember knows the
difference between military actions and nonmilitary actions. 162 The Min-
ister further argued that members of the armed forces may not be able to
152. 83 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 878-79 (1985).
153. See 76 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 236-37 (1984).
154. d at 237.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 236-37.
157. Id at 237.
158. Id.
159. Id.; see also 93 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th Ser.) 173 (1986) (John Lee, the Parlimentary
Under Secretary of State for Defence Procurement, stated that "attempts over the years to
distinguish between activities with a military character and those which are essentially civil In
nature have always foundered because of the discrimination it would create between different
categories of service men and because it would create more anomalies than it would remove'),





prove negligence, 163 to which Ashley responded that the decision ought
to be left to the courts.1 64
Eventually Stanley notified Parliament that the Government would
agree to the repeal of section 10 if the repeal bill contained provisions
that would reactivate section 10 in case of war or national emergency.1
65
Parliament included reactivation provisions and the Crown Proceedings
(Armed Forces) Bill of 1987 passed without amendment 66
Section 1 of the 1987 Act provides for the repeal of section 10 of the
Crown Proceedings Act of 1947 except in relation to injuries suffered due
to an act or omission committed before the date on which the 1987 Act
was passed. 6 7 Section 2 of the 1987 Act provides that the Secretary of
State may reactivate section 10 in cases of imminent national danger or
great emergency. 68 The 1987 Act does not contain offset provisions, but
the Secretary of State may reduce a pension entitlement by the amount of
an award of damages pursuant to the 1987 Act.1
69
There are a number of explanations for the passage of the repeal.
Perhaps most importantly, between 1947 and the mid-1980s, Parliament
changed its beliefs concerning the servicemembers' right to sue the gov-
ernment. 70 In 1987 Winston Churchill, a Member of Parliament from
Davyhulme, remarked that "[t]he general climate of public opinion in
civil and human rights has changed considerably since [the 1947 Act]
was enacted."' 7 ' By the 1980s Parliament was less willing to accept the
idea that the special circumstances of military life justify depriving ser-
vicemembers of the rights enjoyed by their fellow citizens.' 7 1 The simi-
larities between military and civilian life were particularly evident in
peacetime, and in circumstances similar to those experienced by other
disciplined forces that were engaged in hazardous duties, such as the po-
lice and the fire forces.'73 Indeed, John Powley, the Member of Parlia-
163. Id
164. Id
165. Dickinson, supra note 147, at 435.
166. 114 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 925 (1987).
167. Crown Proceedings (Armed Forces) Act, supra note 9, § 1.
168. Id. § 2(2).
169. Boyd, supra note 122, at 247 (citing Article 55, Naval, Military and Air Force, etc.,
(Disablement and Death) Service Pensions Order 1983, S.I. 1983 No. 883). Boyd suggests that
"more could have been done to ensure that damages and war pension awards are in fact offset,
since the possibility of overlap detracts from the efficacy of the pension scheme by enhancing
the potential additional benefits available at common law." Id
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ment from Norwich, South, remarked that the operations that he had
observed on an army base were much like those in any civilian work
place.174 Because of this similarity, Powley found little reason to deny
servicemembers the rights conferred by the 1947 Act." 5
A belief in the inadequacy of compensation available to ser-
vicemembers also contributed to the repeal.176 In 1947 many Members
of Parliament believed that the military compensation schemes would be
comparable to those recoverable by civilians suing under the 1947 Act. 
177
However, by the 1980s civilian court negligence awards outstripped,
sometimes by a factor of ten or more, compensation available to ser-
vicemembers. 178 This was partially because the military failed to com-
pensate for certain types of damages for which civilian courts
compensated, such as loss of future earnings.
179
An additional problem that Parliament felt compelled to remedy
was the inability of injured servicemembers or their survivors to examine
the records regarding the injury or death of a servicemember. 180 In mov-
ing for a second reading of the proposed Crown Proceedings (Armed
Forces) Bill of 1987, Churchill drew attention to the pain ser-
vicemembers and their families suffer as a result of not being informed of
the circumstances surrounding injury or death.'I Moreover, Churchill
expressed a suspicion that military officials were engaging in coverups,
using section 10 to prevent disclosure."82 Churchill hoped that the ad-
versarial system, with its discovery and testimonial processes, would help
cure these defects.
183
To allay the fears of those who believed that the repeal would lead
to the breakdown of military discipline, proponents of the repeal set forth
two arguments. First, they noted that the Defence Ministry would pay
174. Id. at 592.
175. Id.
176. 107 PARL. DEB., H.C., supra note 150, at 85.
177. Id.
178. Id.; 110 PARL. DEB., H.C., supra note 146, at 568-69. Churchill stated:
It is evident that it was not the intention of the Labour Government or of Parliament
to place the service man at a disadvantage compared with his civilian counterpart,
but rather to provide what might today be called a 'no fault' system of compensation
that effectively cut out the lawyers and the courts, and with them much expense and
delay. Regrettably, that is not how things have worked out.
Id at 569.
179. 110 PARL. DEB., H.C., supra note 146, at 569-70.






the damages if a court found that a servicemember was negligent.",
Thus, a court could not compel, an officer to pay damages for injuries
caused by negligent orders."3 5 Second, and more importantly, propo-
nents of the repeal noted that the repeal would apply only in peacetime.
Section 10 can be reactivated in the event of hostility or grave national
emergency. 8 6 Thus, there would be no fear of a breakdown of military
discipline during combat caused by the repeal."3 7
In addition, the Ministry of Defence would continue to provide al-
ternate compensation for injured servicemembers who wish to avoid liti-
gation.' 8 The debates reflected the hope that most servicemembers
would use these compensation schemes, thus minimizing the Crown's lit-
igation costs.'8 9
The repeal of section 10, embodied in the Crown Proceedings
(Armed Forces) Bill of 1987, which became the Crown Proceedings
(Armed Forces) Act of 1987, passed easily through Parliament.t19 Aside
from the initial objections from the Ministry of Defence, the parliamen-
tary debates showed no general opposition to the repeal.' 9 ' However,
Parliament vehemently debated one issue: whether the repeal should be
made retroactive to cover injuries incurred prior to the effective date of
the repeal. 1
92
The 1987 Act made section 10's repeal prospective only.193 Without
retroactivity, servicemembers and veterans who sustained their injuries
prior to the effective date of the 1987 Act do not benefit from the re-
peal. 194 This includes members of the organizations that worked to elim-
inate section 10.
184. 107 PARL. DEB., H.C., supra note 150, at 86.
185. Id at 85-86.
186. Id at 86; see supra text accompanying note 168. Ms. Fiona Boyd noted, however, the
uncertainty of when the reactivation provision would be used. Boyd remarked: "[W]hilst the
provision does not expressly exclude the possibility of judicial review, the sensitivity of the
issue in question would probably make the courts unwilling to intervene; in any case, the
vagueness of the wording involved leaves a great deal of discretion to the Secretary of State."
Boyd, supra note 122, at 248.
Boyd further noted that section 10 has not been revived "in respect of the conflict in
Northern Ireland, which, it is arguable, could be classified as a 'great emergency' under section
2(2)(a)." I
187. 107 PARt- DEB., H.C., supra note 150, at 86.
188. 110 PARL DEB., H.C., supra note 146, at 573.
189. See id at 573-74.
190. See generally id at 567-609.
191. See generally 110 PARi DEB., H.C, supra note 146, at 573.
192. See, eg., id at 576-78.
193. Crown Proceedings (Armed Forces) Act, supra note 9.
194. 110 PARt- DEB., H.C., supra note 146, at 576.
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John Cartwright of Woolwich, accused the Government of opposing
retroactivity solely to avoid litigating the so-called "atomic veterans" is-
sue. A government report stated that the armed forces had used soldiers
as guinea pigs to discover the effects of nuclear explosions on humans
without protection.1 95 Cartwright's claim was bolstered by the fact that,
despite a finding by the National Radiological Protection Board for the
United Kingdom that servicemembers had sustained injuries in the nu-
clear weapons tests,1 96 the Minister of State for Defence Procurement
claimed that no one had been harmed as a result of the atomic tests.'
97
Cartwright further argued that retroactive legislation should be in-
troduced when it is in the national interest.1 98 Ashley noted that making
the repeal retroactive would not make negligent servicemembers retroac-
tively liable, since the Minister of Defence would pay costs and damages
awarded under the 1947 Act.199
Despite these arguments, Parliament did not make the repeal retro-
active.2"° Those who remain without a remedy under the 1987 Act in-
clude approximately 20,000 veterans who took part in atomic tests in
Australia and the South Pacific in the 1950s and 1960s.20' To provide a
remedy for atomic veteran cases that arose prior to the repeal of section
10, a number of Members of Parliament suggested the establishment of
an alternative compensation fund for cases arising out of atomic weapons
testing.202 This fund has yet to be developed, mainly because the Minis-
try of Defence asserts that there is no causal connection between the
atomic weapons tests and the diseases from which former ser-
195. Id. at 576, 582. Those opposed to making the repeal retroactive claimed that they did
so on the principle that retroactive liability should never be imposed. They argued that retro-
activity has been resisted "as a basic concept" by successive British Governments. Id. at 572,
They argued that where there had been retroactive laws, they endowed a retroactive benefit,
rather than imposed a retroactive liability, and that making the repeal retroactive would be
unfair to the defendant-servicemember. Even though the Crown would stand behind the ser-
vicemember, he or she would be embroiled in litigation, perhaps decades after the incident
which gave rise to the action occurred. Id.
196. Id. at 587.
197. Id
198. Id at 581. Mr. McNamara of Kingston on Hull, North found precedential retroac-
tive legislation, for example, in the Pneumoconiosis Acts of 1979 and 1985, which provided for
retroactive relief on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 588.
199. 114 PARL. DEB., H.C., supra note 166, at 939. But see, Boyd, supra note 122, at 246
(noting that although the allegedly negligent servicemember would not be financially liable for
any tort the servicemember may have committed, there would be "an element of personal
culpability." Boyd further noted that "in the case of personnel still serving, a finding of negli-
gence could jeopardise promotion prospects and raise the possibility of disciplinary action.")
200. Crown Proceedings (Armed Forces) Act, supra note 9.
201. 114 PARL. DEi., H.C., supra note 166, at 927.
202. See, e.g., id. at 926-27.
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vicemembers who participated in the atomic weapons tests suffer.2 °3
IV. PROPOSAL: THE UNITED STATES SHOULD
AMEND THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT TO
ALLOW SERVICEMEMBERS TO SUE
FOR INJURIES THAT ARE
INCIDENT TO SERVICE
In the United States, a servicemember who, because of improper
treatment of an infection by military physicians, lost the frontal portion
of his skull, has no judicial remedy. 2' During an operation, a physician
left sponges in a servicewoman's body, rendering her sterile.205 She has
no judicial recourse.' 6 The courts denied a remedy to the widow of an
astronaut killed in the space shuttle Challenger explosion.20 7 Despite the
negligent design of the shuttle, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals did
not permit the widow to maintain a wrongful death action.20
Despite overwhelming criticism of the Feres doctrine,2"° the United
203. See, eg., 135 PAR-L DEB., I-.C. (6th ser.) 591 (1988). There is another sign of hope
for victims of atomic weapons testing: since the repeal there has been a suit worth noting by a
servicemember who claimed he was injured in atomic weapons tests. Pearce v. Secretary of
State for Defence, 2 W.L.R. 1027 (H.L. 1988), was a test case supported by the British Nuclear
Test Veterans' Association. It concerned a claim for damages brought by a former soldier
with the Royal Engineers who had been stationed on Christmas Island from December 1957 to
October 1958. The former soldier alleged exposure to radiation from tests being carried out on
the island. Pearce successfully claimed that since the authorities carrying out the tests were
not members of the armed forces, section 10 immunity would not apply. Dickinson, supra
note 147, at 436 (1987). It has yet to be seen whether Pearce will be an isolated case, or if it
will open the door for recovery for other former servicemembers who were injured in atomic
weapons testing. Id.
204. Medical Malpractice, supra note 46, at 8 (statement of Sen. Jim Sasser).
205. Id. at 10.
206. Id.
207. Smith v. United States, 877 F.2d 40 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1111
(1990).
208. Id.
209. See, eg., Note, Supreme Court Extends the Feres Doctrine Bar, supra note I, at 209
(criticizing the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Johnson on the grounds that the
circumstances under which the injury occurred "do not fall within the only military exception
expressly provided for in the FTCA" (citing 28 U.S.C § 26800) (1982)) (the combatant activi-
ties exception), and because "the three rationales the Court set forth in Feres do not justify a
prohibition on suits like Mrs. Johnson's"); Note, Feres Doctrine Gets New Life, supra note 12,
at 221-22 (concluding that in cases involving the alleged negligence of civilian military employ-
ees "the Feres doctrine did not automatically bar the suit. Instead, a court should examine the
facts of each case, in light of the rationale supporting the doctrine, to determine if hearing the
petitioner's claim would circumvent the purposes of the [FTCA] as construed by the Court");
Note, Forgotten Rights of Military Personnel, supra note 12, at 169-83 (discussing H.R. 1054,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), which would have eliminated the Feres doctrine in the area of
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States Congress has not eliminated the military exception to its tort
claims act.2"' Recently, however, there have been. unsuccessful congres-
sional efforts to eliminate the Feres doctrine in military medical malprac-
tice cases.21 The most recent proposals to allow military medical
military medical malpractice, and suggesting a resolution that would eliminate Fetes alto-
gether); Note, The Feres Doctrine, supra note 12, at 576-83 (not arguing for the abrogation of
the Feres doctrine, but instead criticizing United States v. Johnson and United States v. Stanley
on the grounds that they are inconsistent with earlier cases that applied the Feres doctrine);
Note, They Fight to Protect Our Rights, supra note 114, at 160-62 (criticizing United States .
Stanley as allowing human experimentation in violation of the Nuremberg principles). Cf.
Note, Method to This Madness: Acknowledging the Legitimate Rationale Behind the Fcrcs Doc-
trine, 68 B.U.L. REv. 981, 1017-1018 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Method to This Madness] (sug-
gesting limiting Feres to a "military necessity" rationale, under which civilian courts would
have their jurisdiction over cases involving the military, limited only when the claim would
require "a civilian court to interfere with either the legitimate exercise of professional military
judgment or the disciplinary structure of the military."); Comment, Service Member Recovery
for Military Medical Malpractice Under the Federal Tort Claims cet: A Judicial Response, 19
ST. MARY'S L.J. 203, 217-29 (1987) (suggesting that in cases involving military medical mal-
practice, courts should distinguish between military decisions, such as mandatory physical
examinations and vaccinations, which, according to the author, if included in the FTCA would
require civilian courts to "tamper[] with the decision-making process of the military" and
medical decisions that arise from situations where military personnel "voluntarily report for
personal treatment of ailments apart from mass medical procedur.s required by orders, regula-
tions, or as part of the military's preventive medicine program." The former should, according
to the author, fall within the parameters of Feres, and the latter without).
210. Past proposed bills to eliminate the Feres doctrine include H.R. 2659, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 4 (1979) and S. 695, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). These amendments would have
allowed suits against the United States "not only for the common law torts committed by
federal employees 'within the scope of their employment' but also for the constitutional wrongs
committed either 'within the scope of' or 'under color of office.'" Note, Intramilitary Tort
Immunity, supra note 1, at 627 n.31 (quoting Comment, Constitutional Tort Remedies: A Pro.
posed Amendment to The Federal Tort Claims Act, 12 CONN. L. REv. 492, 531 (1980)).
Senator Jim Sasser of Tennessee, one of the strongest supporters of eliminating the Fetes
doctrine in the area of medical malpractice, is opposed to eliminating the doctrine in its en-
tirety. See infra text accompanying notes 278-82.
211. Military medical malpractice bills include H.R. 1942, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983);
H.R. 1161, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 3174, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 536,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). Another earlier medical malpractice bill is H.R. 1054, supra
note 207. Note, Forgotten Rights of Military Personnel, supra note 12, at 170 n.101.
The Department of Defense has suggested that, rather than amending the FTCA to elimi-
nate the Fetes doctrine, Congress should instead amend the Military Claims Act (MCA), 10
U.S.C. § 2733 (1988), to allow active-duty military personnel to file claims for military medical
malpractice. Medical Malpractice, supra note 46, at 51 (responses of Kathleen Buck to Writ-
ten Questions Submitted by Senator Heflin). The MCA is an "administrative remedy for the
payment of claims for property damage, personal injury, or death caused by either civilian or
military personnel of the Armed Forces acting within the scope of their employment." Id. at
26.
According to Ms. Kathleen Buck, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, the
advantages of an amended MCA to the elimination of the Feres doctrine are: (1) that the
MCA would provide recovery for military personnel no matter where the injury occurred,
whereas the FTCA does not cover personnel stationed overseas; (2) that under the MCA,
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malpractice suits under the FTCA were introduced in the House and the
Senate in 1989.212 The House has passed its resolution and sent it to the
Senate Judiciary Committee, where it has been since July 11, 1989.213
The House bill would amend the FTCA explicitly to allow claims for
personal injury or death of members of the armed forces serving on ac-
tive duty or on full-time National Guard duty.214 The injury or death
must be the result of negligent medical or dental care furnished in a non-
combatant situation by a member of the Armed Forces in a medical facil-
ity operated by the United States.215 The resolution would reduce any
FTCA award by the amount of other Government benefits awarded to
the servicemember, such as those provided by the Veterans
Administration.216
Congress should enact legislation with provisions similar to this re-
cent bill to eliminate Feres as it applies to all suits arising from non-
combatant activities. The Supreme Court in Feres refused to provide a
judicial remedy to the plaintiffs unless explicitly authorized by Con-
gress.21 7 Congress should, therefore, unambiguously confer on ser-
vicemembers the rights granted by the FTCA. Congress should
eliminate Feres both because its rationale is flawed, and because, as Par-
liament has correctly concluded, it is fundamentally unfair and discrimi-
natory to exclude members of the armed forces from the rights and
protections afforded the rest of the population under a nation's tort
claims act.
218
There are numerous reasons supporting the elimination of the Feres
doctrine. Nothing in the language of the FTCA itself indicates that Con-
civilian courts do not second-guess military decisions, and the MCA would not "disrupt mili-
tary operations by making servicemembers subject to the orders, dockets, and schedules of
civilian judges and lawyers;" (3) that the MCA is an efficient administrative system; (4) that
the FICA permits lawyers to take fees of 20% of an award if the claim is settled administra-
tively and 25% if a case goes to court, whereas the amended MCA would limit attorneys' fees
to 10%; (5) that "[tihe MCA provides an unbiased review of claims"; and (6) that for over 30
years the MCA has provided recovery for claimants overseas who are not barred by Feres to
recover for malpractice, and that it has a "proven record for handling malpractice claims." Id
at 26-29.
212. H.R. 536, supra note 211; S. 274, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989). S. 274 was referred to
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on January 25, 1989. Bill Tracking Report S. 274.
LEXIS, Genfed library, Bills file.
213. Bill Tracking Report S. 274, supra note 212.
214. H.R. REP'. No. 87, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1989).
215. Id
216. Id at 6.
217. I at 2-3.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 171-75.
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gress intended to create a military exception.219 Moreover, the three pol-
icies underlying the Feres decision-the uniquely governmental nature of
the military, the undesirability of the armed services being governed by
the various state laws, and the availability of alternative' compensation
schemes22 0-- are without merit. The Supreme Court demonstrated the
illegitmacy of these rationales in its decisions in United States v. Brown,
United States v. Muniz, and Indian Towing Co. v. United States.
There is nothing uniquely governmental about many military activi-
ties. As noted in the parliamentary debates surrounding the 1987 Act,
many military functions have private sector analogies.221
The Supreme Court itself acknowledged this in United States v.
Brown, when it made the analogy between private and military hospi-
tals222 In his testimony before the Subcommittee on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Mr.
Mark A. Dumbroff, a former attorney with the Civil Division of the
United States Department of Justice specializing in tort litigation, re-
marked that he had a "hard time categorizing medical malpractice as
military or nonmilitary." '223 He continued: "Negligence is negligence
and the federal government, in areas where there are not uniquely gov-
ernmental ... [activities involved in noncombat situations] should be
held to the same standards of accountability as the rest of society."
224
In addition, the Supreme Court held the Coast Guard liable for neg-
ligently operating a lighthouse,225 and allowed prisoners to sue federal
prison officials, 226 even though there is no private analogy to the Coast
Guard or federal prisons. 227 The governmental nature of military activi-
219. See Compensation for Victims of Military Medical Malpractice: Hearings on H.R. Res.
1054 Before the Subcomm. on Military Personnel and Compensation of the House Comm. on
Armed Services, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 12 (1987) [hereinafter Compensation] (statement of Bar-
ney Frank). See also, H.R. REP. No. 87, supra note 214, at 2; FICA, supra note 3.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 41-50.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 173-75.
222. United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112-13 (1954).
223. Malpractice, supra note 13, at 89 (statement of Mark A. Dumbrofi).
224. Id. at 94.
225. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
226. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
227. See P. HOGG, LIABILITY OF THE CROWN IN AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND THE
UNITED KINGDOM 79 (1971); Note, Supreme Court Extends the Feres Doctrine Bar, supra
note 1, at 210 (discussing Muniz: "Incredibly, the Court thus affords convicted federal
criminals a right to tort recovery that it denies to men who devote their lives to the defense of
this country"). See also Note, Feres Doctrine Gets New Life, supra note 12, at 220 (arguing
that strict application of the distinctively federal relationship rationale, as well as the alterna-
tive compensation rationale, to Feres "automatically bars every servicemember's claim ...
[and that] ... [s]uch an approach conflicts with prior Court decisions") (citing Shearer, 473
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ties should be irrelevant in FTCA actions. As Professor Peter W. Hogg
has suggested, the FTCA should be interpreted as requiring the court "to
disregard the status of the parties and examine the remaining circum-
stances to see if they are analogous to those which would give rise to
private tort liability. ' 2 2 8 Courts should examine the actual activities en-
gaged in by the alleged tortfeasor and the victim." 9
The second Feres rationale-the undesirability of applying state law
to the military-is unfounded for two reasons. First, the United States
military is often subject to the laws of the several states." 0 When a de-
pendent or spouse of a servicemember sues the military for medical mal-
practice, the court deciding the case applies the law of the state in which
the action is brought. 31 Second, the Court in Feres maintained that the
courts should not subject the individual servicemember to the tort laws
of a state in which he happens to be stationed, 2 but in United States v.
Muniz, the Supreme Court allowed federal prisoners to sue the United
States under the FTCA, even though they could not choose which state's
law would govern the action. 3 The Muniz Court concluded that com-
U.S. at 57; Brown, 348 U.S. at 112; Brooks, 337 U.S. at 52-53); Note, They Fight To Protect
Our Rights, supra note 114, at 153 n.180 (claiming that the "parallel personal liability provi-
sion is no longer utilized") (citing Stencel, 431 U.S. at 671-72 (stating that the "Court only
elaborated on three underlying rationales")); Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315,
319 (1957); Indian Towing Co., 350 U.S. at 64-65).
228. P. HoGG, supra note 227, at 79.
229. See Seidelson, The Feres Exception To The Federal Tort Claims Act: New Insight Into
An Old Problem, 11 HorsTRA L. REv. 629, 633 (1983). Seidelson criticizes the Court's state-
ment in Feres that:
[i]n the usual civilian doctor and patient relationship, there is of course a liability for
malpractice. And a landlord would undoubtedly be held liable if an injury occurred
to a tenant as the result of a negligently maintained heating plant. But the liability
assumed by the Government here is that created by 'all the circumstances,' not that
which a few of the circumstances might create.
IM. (quoting Feres, 340 U.S. at 142). Seidelson argues that this statement is "demonstrably
overbroad." Id. He maintains that:
[No one would contend that a motorist injured when his vehicle is struck by a negli-
gently operated mail delivery truck could not recover under the FICA. The Act's
applicability is apparent and remains so even if the truck were carrying first-class
mail, an activity prohibited to any private entity. Consequently, the applicability of
the FTCA simply cannot be determined by 'all the circumstances' as Feres would
require. To do so would be to render the Act inapplicable to virtually every set of
circumstances imaginable simply by enlarging the facts to the point where no private
entity would be engaging in precisely the same activity as the government employee.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
230. ILR. REP. No. 87, supra note 214, at 4; see also H.R. REP. No. 288, 99th Cong., Ist
Sess. 4-5 (1985).
231. H.R. REp. No. 87, supra note 214, at 4.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
233. Muniz, 374 U.S. at 150, 161.
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pletely denying the prisoners recovery under the FTCA would be more
harmful to them than subjecting them to the laws of the various states.
234
In addition, as Professor David L. Seidelson aptly points out, by filing
suit under the FTCA, the servicemember has chosen that his suit be sub-
ject to the substantive laws of the state in which the injury occurred,
rather than have no suit at all.235
The third Feres rationale-that alternate compensation schemes are
adequate-is also without merit. First, if Congress eliminates the Feres
doctrine, it could provide for a reduction in FTCA by the amount of
compensation received from other sources. This would prevent double
recovery by a servicemember of both statutory compensation and an
FTCA award.236  The Court in Brooks provided this very type of
reduction.237
Second, these schemes are inadequate, despite arguments such as
those of Mr. Brent 0. Hatch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil
Division. Hatch argued that the alternative compensation schemes avail-
able to servicemembers are adequate.23 Hatch noted that members of
the U.S. Armed Forces receive free medical care when injured or ill, and
are granted unlimited sick leave with full pay and allowances until the
servicemember is well or released from active duty.23 9 In addition, as
Hatch pointed out, survivors of servicemembers are eligible for death
234. Comment, The Feres Doctrine: Should It Continue to Bar FTCA Actions By Service-
men Who Are Injured While Involved In Activities Incident To Their Service?, supra note 2, at
201.
235. Seidelson, supra note 229, at 634.
236. H.R. 536 would provide:
(c) Reduction of Awards or Judgments by Other Government Benefits. - The
amount of an award or judgment on a claim under this section for personal injury or
death of a member of the Armed Forces shall be reduced by the agency making the
award or the court entering the judgment, as the case may be, by an amount equal to
the total amount of other monetary benefits received or to be received by the member
and the member's estate, survivors, and beneficiaries, under title 10, title 37, or title
38 that are attributable to the personal injury or death from which the claim arose.
If the amount of future benefits cannot be determined because the benefits are pro-
vided under an annuity or other program of periodic payments, the amount of the
reduction with respect to such future benefits shall be the actuarial present value of
such future benefits.
H.R. 536, supra note 211, at 2. See also Note, Forgotten Rights of Military Personnel, supra
note 12, at 182 (proposing an amendment to the FTCA to eliminate Feres that would include
similar offset provisions).
237. See supra text accompanying note 28. As one commentator has noted, "the Supreme
Court moved from the position it took in Brooks that the Military Compensation System was
not the exclusive remedy to the position it took in Stencel that it i; exclusive." Whalen, supra
note 71, at 111.
238. H.R. REP. No. 87, supra note 214, at 12-13.
239. Id. at 12 (citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 3721, 6201, 8721).
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gratuity benefits, which include six months of base pay as well as subsi-
dized insurance or insurance-type plans.2' Permanently disabled ser-
vicemembers participate in a comprehensive disability retirement
system.24 Further, veterans also can take advantage of the Veteran Ben-
efits Act (VBA).242 The payments provided by the VBA are, according
to supporters of Feres, "more precisely compensatory for lost income
than are lump-sum awards of tort damages." '243 They "rise or fall in
response to actual changes in levels of disability and continue throughout
... [the veteran's] lifetime[ ] while disability persists." 2" In addition, as
when the Supreme Court decided Feres, statutory schemes still provide
greater compensation than state workers' compensation awards.245
However, the statutory compensation schemes are inadequate.
246
For example, these schemes do not compensate for pain and suffering or
for the loss of future income. 2 7 If Congress amended the FTCA explic-
itly to include claims by members of the military, servicemembers would
be able to receive awards comparable to those of civilians. At the same
time, the awards would not be extravagant. Suits brought under the
FTCA are tried before judges, not juries. This eliminates the threat of
huge jury awards.2 48 The threat of large damage awards is further di-
minished by FTCA prohibition of the imposition of punitive damage
awards against the United States.249
The United States also could minimize the threat of large civil trial
awards and litigation costs by leaving the alternative compensation
schemes in place as an option for those servicemembers who wish to
forego filing suit, as Parliament provided in the 1987 Act.' If these
schemes are as superior to FTCA actions as Feres supporters claim,"'
then most servicemembers will bypass filing claims under the FTCA and
opt for statutory compensation.
240. Id (citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 1475-1482; 10 U.S.C. §§ 1447 et seq.; 38 U.S.C. §§ 765 et
seq.).
241. Id (citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1401 (1983)).
242. Id at 13.
243. Id at 16.
244. Id
245. Id at 13 (citing Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673
(1977)).
246. Compensation, supra note 219, at 14 (statement of Rep. Barney Frank).
247. I d; see also Malpractice, supra note 13, at 10 (statement of Sen. Edward. M.
Kennedy).
248. Compensation, supra note 219, at 13 (statement of Rep. Barney Frank).
249. Id; see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 2674 (West 1965 & Supp. 1989) (recovery of pretrial inter-
est denied under FrCA).
250. See supra text accompanying notes 188-89.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 238-45.
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The three rationales articulated in the Feres decision are no longer
the only policies underlying the Feres doctrine. The principle policy for
maintaining the Feres doctrine is a fear that military discipline will break
down if the government allows servicemembers to sue their superiors.
25 2
Yet there is no evidence that such a disciplinary breakdown would occur.
The House Judiciary Committee, when considering one of the military
medical malpractice bills, concluded that if a servicemember could sue
on behalf of a dependent without a breakdown in military discipline, then
there is no reason why suing on his or her own behalf would precipitate a
disciplinary collapse.253 This same analysis would also hold true in non-
medical negligence cases.254 In addition, the Supreme Court has not
overruled the Brooks decision which allows servicemembers who are in-
jured by the negligence of other servicemembers while off-base and off-
duty to bring suit under the FTCA. Therefore, servicemembers already
can bring their superiors to court.
Eliminating Feres could even improve the functioning of the services
by making members of the military more accountable for their actions.
255
In fact, Feres may have a harmful effect on the services by preventing
252. See supra text accompanying notes 64-68, 83-91, 95-98, 106-08, 114-16; see also Medi.
cal Malpractice, supra note 46, at 11 (statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond) (expressing concern
that Senate and House resolutions to eliminate the Feres doctrine in the area of medical mal-
practice "could endanger morale and discipline" among members of the armed forces).
For criticism of this rationale, see Note, The Feres Doctrine, supra note 12, at 579 (con-
demning the use of the military discipline rationale in Johnson and Stanley since the suits were
against civilian military employees).
Another reason for retaining the Feres doctrine is the "fiscal uncertainty" that would be
caused by its elimination. Comment, Why Congress Should Not Legislatively Repeal the Feres
Doctrine - A Struggle in Equity, 18 TEx. TECH L. Rv. 819, 839 (1987) [hereinafter Struggle
in Equity].
253. H.R. REP. No. 87, supra note 214, at 4. See also Medical Malpractice, supra note 46,
at 8 (statement of Sen. Jim Sasser). Senator Sasser posed the question:
[I]f the wife can sue or if the active duty military personnel can bring suit on behalf
of a minor child who has been injured as a result of malpractice in the military
medical system, how does it possibly damage discipline if the military person, him or
herself, brings the suit?
id. at 9.
254. H.R. REP. No. 87, supra note 214, at 4.
255. See id.; Malpractice, supra note 13, at 11 (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy).
But see Medical Malpractice, supra note 46, at 11-13 (statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond)
(suggesting that eliminating the Feres doctrine in the area of military medical malpractice "will
in all likelihood do little to improve medical service provided to members of our Armed
Forces" and that "it might be better to recruit more qualified medical personnel and mandate
better continuing medical training"); id. at 21 (statement of Ms. Kathleen Buck, General
Counsel, Dep't of Defense) (arguing that:
providing the opportunity to sue in tort will, in no way, improve medical care for
military personnel. Already, 70 percent of the patients served by military medical
facilities may sue for malpractice. It defies common sense to assert that allowing the
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investigations concomitant with civil litigation.256 Just as Churchill had
argued in Parliament," 7 Senator Jim Sasser of Tennessee, the author of
the most recent Senate military medical malpractice bill,258 argued that
some military medical personnel use the Feres doctrine as a shield to
prevent investigations.- 9 If Congress eliminated the Feres doctrine, ci-
vilian courts would allow discovery with regard to alleged military negli-
gence. This not only would make the armed services more accountable,
but also would allow military negligence victims and their families to be
comforted by knowing the circumstances surrounding the ser-
vicemember's injury or death.2"
Allowing servicemembers' claims under the FTCA also would help
raise morale.261 As Churchill argued, the ability of servicemembers to
obtain legal redress would raise their confidence in the military sys-
tem.262 Senator Sasser found it "hard to imagine what could be worse
for a soldier's morale than the feeling that he or she did not get a fair
shake from the Government that they [sic] volunteered to defend."
263
remaining 30 percent to litigate under the Federal Tort Claims Act, would achieve
any beneficial effect upon the quality of health care).
256. Malpractice, supra note 13, at 12-13 ,,catement ,- ;en. Fm Sasser).
257. See supra text accompanying note 182.
258. S. 274, supra note 212.
259. Malpractice, supra note 13, at 12-13 (statement of Sen. Jim Sasser).
260. See Compensation, supra note 219, at 141-42 (statement of Mrs. Truc-Nuong Brown).
Mrs. Truc-Nuong Brown, for the Maryland and Washington D.C. Chapter, Concerned Amer-
icans for Military Improvements (CAMI), testified at a House Armed Services Committee
hearing. Brown testified that her husband entered a military hospital for elective surgery and
had emerged 100% physically and mentally disabled. Mrs. Brown has been unable to discover
the truth about what happened to her husband in the military hospital. Id. at 141.
261. Malpractice, supra note 13, at 13.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 181-83.
263. Medical Malpractice, supra note 46, at 9 (statement of Sen. Jim Sasser). As in Great
Britain in the debates surrounding the 1987 Act, it has been argued in the hearings with regard
to the passage of an exception to the Feres doctrine for military medical malpractice that the
passage of such a bill would hurt morale because service people would be treated differently
depending on whether they were in combat or noncombat activities. Medical Malpractice,
supra note 46, at 14 (statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond). In answer to Senator Thurmond's
comment, Senator Sasser remarked:
We have to realize that in time of combat, we can't hold our physicians to the
same standard of care that we would in time of peace. For example, if you've got a
surgeon operating in a field hospital, a quarter of a mile behind the front lines, he's
been up for 48 hours with mortar shells bursting all around him, you're not going to
hold him to the same standard of care as you would a surgeon operating ... at
Bethesda Hospital with the finest medical appliances that money can buy around him
and surrounded with nurses and anesthesiologists and all of the things that are neces-
sary for first-class medical care.
I think we would excuse, in time of combat, what we would say in peace time
conditions might be malpractice or even, on occasion, negligence.
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If Congress abolished the Feres doctrine, the courts could not hold
personally liable military personnel whose negligence gives rise to FTCA
suits. Under one of the proposed military medical malpractice bills, the
government would be liable, and not the individual alleged tortfeasor ser-
vicemembers. 264 This provision has probably been rendered superfluous
by the recently passed Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort
Compensation Act.265 Under this Act, upon certification by the Attor-
ney General that the defendant employee was acting in the scope of his
employment when the act or omission that gave rise to an FTCA cause
of action occurred, the United States shaH be substituted as the party
defendant.266 This provision would ensure less disruption in military
units, because the defendant servicemember would not be a party to the
FTCA suit.
2 6 7
In addition, any tort law that would allow suit against a member of
the military would take into account the special circumstances of mili-
tary life. If servicemembers were allowed to bring suit under the FTCA,
the standard of conduct which the courts would apply would be the stan-
dard applied in all negligence cases: that of a reasonable person of ordi-
nary prudence under the circumstances.268 These circumstances would
take into account special dangers peculiar to military training. There-
fore, training officers would not be liable in tort for every injury that
occurs; they would be liable only for those injuries resulting from unrea-
sonable acts in training situations giving rise to injury.
Of the numerous reasons to abrogate the Feres doctrine, the most
compelling is one of equity. 269 Every person in the United States, except
active duty members of the armed services, can bring suit under the
Id. at 14 (statement of Sen. Jim Sasser).
Representative Barney Frank further answered Senator Thurmond's remarks, by quoting
from Justice Scalia's dissent in United States v. Johnson: "[N]on-uniform recovery cannot
possibly be worse than what Feres provides, uniform non-recovery." Id. at 17 (statement of
Rep. Barney Frank). Rep. Frank further suggests that:
Rather than the inconsistencies between one soldier and another, let's look also
at the inconsistencies between the soldier and everybody else in our society. And I
think the morale of the solider [sic] is better served by what Justice Scalia says to the
soldier, we're going to give you a non-uniform right of recovery and that's better
than giving you a uniform right of nonrecovery.
Id. at 19.
264. Malpractice, supra note 13, at 11 (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy).
265. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2679(d) (West. Supp. 1989).
266. Id.
267. In addition, military physicians are already immunized from suit under 10 U.S.C,A.
§ 1089 (West 1983 & 1990 Supp.).
268. PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 173-74 (W.P. Keeton 5th ed. 1984).
269. H.R. REP. No. 87, supra note 214, at 4.
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FTCA.2 70 Active duty military personnel constitute only one-third of
the total number of people treated in military medical facilities, yet they
are the only individuals barred from suing for malpractice under the
F CA.2 7 1 To prevent servicemembers from bringing FTCA suits on
their own behalf, when they are able to bring such suits on behalf of
relatives,272 is not only nonsensical, but also unjust.
Finally, if Congress eliminates the Feres doctrine, it should include a
provision similar to the reactivation provision included in Great Britain's
Crown Proceeding (Armed Forces) Act of 1987.273 Such a provision
would disallow FTCA suits by servicemembers during times of war or
national emergency.274 The inclusion of a reactivation provision should
allay any fears of a breakdown of military discipline in war or war-like
situations.275
The quantity of bills introduced in Congress to allow military medi-
cal malpractice claims2 76 gives one hope that Congress will eliminate the
Feres doctrine in the area of medical malpractice. However, Congress
has not recently introduced any bills to completely abrogate the Feres
doctrine,277 and the debates surrounding the medical malpractice bill do
not indicate that Congress will in the near future.
The House Judiciary Committee, which supported the most recent
military medical malpractice amendment to the FTCA, fully supported
the policy that military personnel should not be allowed to sue the Gov-
ernment for negligence relating to the performance of military duties.2 78
Senator Sasser also believed that medical malpractice was distinguishable
from other types of negligence.27 9 He believed that physicians should be
held to a higher standard than other members of the military." In addi-
tion, Sasser was more protective of servicemembers receiving medical
270. Medical Malpractice, supra note 46, at 15 (statement of Rep. Barney Frank).
271. Id ; see also Malpractice, supra note 13, at 13 (statement of Sen. Jim Sasser) (currently
70-80% of those treated in military hospitals can sue for malpractice).
272. See supra text accompanying note 253.
273. See supra text accompanying note 186.
274. However, Congress should delineate more clearly than the British Parliament pre-
cisely when the reactivation provision should be used. See supra note 186.
275. But see Comment, Struggle in Equity, supra note 252, at 844 (arguing that distinguish-
ing between peacetime and wartime situations is "appealing but unsupportable. Military disci-
pline is not something that miraculously appears in combat, and then fades away in the
aftermath of the fight. It is a constant. Discipline is learned in peacetime and relied upon
heavily in wartime").
276. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
277. See supra text accompanying note 212.
278. H.R. REp. No. 87, supra note 214, at 4.
279. Malpractice, supra note 13, at 19 (statement of Sen. Jim Sasser).
280. Id.
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treatment. 281 He believed that servicemembers could look out for them-
selves on routine active duty, but not in an operating room or in a physi-
cian's office.282
Senator Sasser's reasoning is erroneous. Congress should not distin-
guish between medical malpractice and other forms of negligence in the
military.283 It is foolish to suggest that servicemembers are able to look
out for themselves when, for example, a fire starts in the barracks in
which they are sleeping,284 or when the life support system in an airplane
fails.285 These victims are entitled to judicial redress to the same extent
as victims of military medical malpractice.
In the United States, as was true in Great Britain, opposition to
making any legislation retroactive is likely28 6 because of a general reluc-
tance to impose retroactive liability2s7 and the cost of retroactivity to the
government. In addition, even though a servicemember who allegedly
was negligent before the repeal of the Feres doctrine would not be held
personally liable for damages, a lawsuit years after the alleged negligence
could disrupt that individual's life.288 Therefore, an elimination of the
Feres doctrine should not be made retroactive. Instead, Congress should
adopt the solution proposed in Parliament: the establishment of alterna-
tive compensation schemes.289 Such a compensation scheme for Viet-
nam-era veterans who were exposed to dioxin and those who were
exposed to ionizing radiation already exists.290 If other types of past ser-
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. An illustration given by Ms. Kathleen Buck, General Counsel, Dep't of Defense, in
her statement against a military medical malpractice bill actually provides the following argu-
ment for why any bill to eliminate the Feres doctrine should cover all negligence in the
military:
A surgeon in a military stateside hospital makes an error. As a result, scr-
vicemember A suffers paralysis. Under the proposed legislation, he could sue the
United States. Servicemember B is walking on the sidewalk outside the hospital and
is hit by a government vehicle driven negligently by a motor pool driver. Ser-
vicemember B is paralyzed as a result of his injuries. He may not sue, although he
has virtually the same disability.
Medical Malpractice, supra note 46, at 39 (statement of Ms. Kathleen Buck, General Counsel,
Dep't of Defense). Rather than permitting neither to recover under the FTCA, as Buck would
suggest, Congress should permit both suits under the FTCA.
284. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
285. See Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
286. See supra notes 192-200 and accompanying text.
287. See supra note 195.
288. See supra notes 195, 199.
289. See supra text accompanying note 202.
290. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 219, 354 (West Supp. 1989).
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vice-related injuries become known, Congress should establish additional
compensation schemes.
V. CONCLUSION
The need to eliminate the Feres doctrine is urgent, given the
Supreme Court's ever-expansive interpretation of this FTCA excep-
tion.29 The Court has applied the doctrine, which originally covered
only cases of negligence between servicemembers, to cases involving
product liability on the part of military suppliers that result in the injury
of servicemembers292 and negligence toward servicemembers on the part
of civilian employees.29 Moreover, the Court has used what was origi-
nally a bar to FTCA actions by servicemembers to deny them the right to
bring non-FTCA constitutional claims against the military forces. 294
The Supreme Court's strengthening of the Feres doctrine should not
be a barrier to its elimination. The Court created the Feres doctrine be-
cause, it maintained, Congress had given it no guidance for applying the
FTCA to the military.295 Congress should now direct the Court. It
should follow Great Britain's lead and eliminate the military exception to
its tort claims act. Congress should look to Great Britain as a model for
how the military exception can be eliminated. As in Great Britain, all
military personnel should have the right to sue under the tort claims act;
the legislature should disallow such suits in times of war or national
emergency; 296 and servicemembers should have the option of using alter-
291. See Medical Malpractice, supra note 46, at 70 (statement of Brent 0. Hatch) (the Feres
doctrine "is even stronger today as a result of the reaffirmation of its rationale by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Johnson, [481 U.S. 681], (1987) and the Court's decisions in United
States v. Stanley, [483 U.S. 669, (1987); United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985); Chappell
v. Wallace 462 U.S. 296 (1983); and Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S.
666, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 882 (1977)").
292. Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
293. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987).
294. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983). One commentator has said that sr-
vicemembers should not be able to bring constitutional claims against the United States be-
cause such claims involve political questions that courts should not resolve. This is because of
a textual commitment of military affairs to the legislature, the substantial activity of Congress
on the field of military matters, and the judiciary's lack of expertise in military affairs. See
Note, Intramilitary Tort Immunity, supra note 12, at 634-40.
295. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
296. American servicemembers presently cannot sue for claims arising out of combatant
activities. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680G) (West 1965). See also Note, Forgotten Rights of Military Per-
sonnel, supra note 12, at 181 (arguing that such a provision would not be necessary, since the
FTCA already has an exception for combatant activities). To allay the fears of those Repre-
sentatives and Senators who may believe that the elimination of Feres would lead to suits
against superiors for orders given in the heat of battle, it should be made explicit in the bill
itself that the law will not apply to such claims.
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native compensation schemes.2 97 In addition, FTCA awards should be
reduced by any compensation received through the compensation
schemes already established for military personnel and veterans.
298
The United States should follow Great Britain's lead and abrogate
its military exception not only because the reasoning behind the Feres
doctrine is flawed, but because, as Members of Parliament have pointed
out, it is more humane and equitable to allow members of the military to
benefit by a nation's tort claims act.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 188-89.
298. Cf supra note 236 and accompanying text.
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